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Debates between partisans of the A- and B-theories of time can often strike
outsiders as somewhat arcane. Fortunately, Prosser has done an admirable job
of making his argument, which concerns the nature of our experience of time
and the implications thereof for the A-theory and the B-theory, accessible to
non-specialist readers, beginning, in ch. 1, with some essential background
on the metaphysics of time. The chapter discusses a number of versions of
the A-theory, according to which time has a dynamic character and gen-
uinely passes, before reviewing the B-theory, according to which time does
not pass.
Prosser himself favours the B-theory, and ch. 2, perhaps the most provoca-
tive chapter of the book, is devoted to critiquing the most influential argument
for the A-theory, which turns on the idea that our experience of time it-
self tells us that time passes. Against this argument, Prosser maintains, first,
that we do not and could not even in principle experience the passage of
time and, second, that we therefore do not in fact genuinely understand the
A-theoretic claim that time passes. Prosser’s view here is surprising (or at
least it was to this non-specialist reader), but he makes a convincing case for
it. After considering a number of distinct B-theoretic arguments, including
an argument from the claim that we have no experience of ontic becoming
(where ontic becoming is the coming into existence of things), an argument
based on the phi phenomenon (in which a dynamic experience is produced by
static stimuli), and an argument designed to undermine the thought that the
B-theory cannot explain why we only ever experience one specific moment in
time, he sets out his novel ‘detector’ and ‘multidetector’ arguments. The core
idea of the detector argument is that, because the A-theory and the B-theory
do not disagree about which physical events occur, there can be no physical
system that detects the alleged passage of time. Given plausible assumptions
about the relation of the mental to the physical, this implies that the mind like-
wise cannot detect the passage of time and therefore that we have no veridical
experience of the passage of time. Themultidetector argument turns on similar
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considerations, and the arguments together are meant to establish that there
could not even in principle be a veridical experience of time passing. Arguing
from a range of theories of representation, he then maintains, more strongly,
that experience cannot even falsely represent the passage of time, i.e. that
experience cannot represent the passage of time at all. The final section of the
chapter then argues that, given the foregoing considerations, the A-theoretic
claim that time passes is effectively meaningless.
Turning from our experience of time to our attitudes to the past and the
future, Prosser begins ch. 3by dismissing the date theory and the token-reflexive
theory as accounts of these attitudes, on the ground that they do not deal
adequately with Prior’s ‘thank goodness’ argument; the key idea here is that
they do not explain how the B-theorist can account for the different attitudes
that we take to past events, as opposed to future events. He then introduces a
person-reflexive theory, according to which, while ‘past’ and ‘future’ appear to
predicate properties of times or events, they in fact refer to two-place relations
between times or events and person-stages; the key idea is that to think of an
event as past or future is to think of it in an implicitly first-personal way. Taking
up the question of why we should have different attitudes towards the past and
the future, Prosser introduces the notion of a subject-environment functional
(SEF) relation. SEF relations, like Gibsonian affordances, concern the subject’s
possibilities for interaction with his environment. The chapter concludes by
suggesting that truth-conditions for beliefs about past and future events can
be given in terms of SEF relations, a suggestion that Prosser develops further
in later chapters.
In ch. 4, Prosser turns from attitudes back to experience, taking up our
experience of rates and durations. Events are experienced as taking place at
a rate and as having a duration. In order to explain this, Prosser assumes
intentionalism, the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is
determined by its content, and argues, on the basis of a ‘Slow Earth’ thought
experiment, for functionalist intentionalism, according to which phenomenal
characters essentially represent SEF relations. Time is also sometimes experi-
enced as passing more quickly or more slowly. In order to explain this, Prosser
appeals again to SEF relations, arguing that, because a subject’s possibilities for
interaction with his environment vary with, for example, his level of alertness,
the nature of his experience of the rate of passage of time is also bound to vary.
Chapter 5 then considers another aspect of experience. Many have argued
that, because we experience change, the ‘now’ of experience must itself be
temporally extended. Prosser is critical of the notion of a specious present and
initially seems to favour an alternative dynamic snapshot theory of experience.
Ultimately, however, he claims that there may be no fact of the matter about
whether the dynamic snapshot theory or the Jamesian specious present better
accounts for our experience of change, in the sense that they may turn out to
be empirically equivalent.
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In ch. 6, Prosser takes on the widespread view that the A-theory is bet-
ter able to explain why change seems dynamic than is the B-theory, which
acknowledges only ‘at-at’ change (in which an entity has certain properties
at a given time and different properties at another time). He argues that the
B-theorist is able to account for the experience of dynamic change but that
doing so requires him to claim that experience has a necessarily false content,
since it misleadingly represents objects as enduring through changes. Chapter
7 then considers our experience of moving through time. Prosser takes for
granted that we inevitably think of past and future in spatial terms, with ‘fu-
ture’ mapping onto ‘in front of ’ and ‘past’ onto ‘behind’, and argues that this
can be explained in terms of SEF relations, since a subject’s possibilities for
action with respect to an event change with its subjective degree of futurity.
Prosser seems to be right that we inevitably think of temporal relations in
terms of spatial relations; interestingly, however, there is some evidence that
the tendency to map ‘future’ onto ‘in front of ’ and ‘past’ onto ‘behind’ may
not quite be universal (Nu´n˜ez and Sweetser 2006).
I cannot say whether this particular point poses a problem for Prosser’s
argument, though I would, in general, have liked to see greater engagement
with relevant empirical work on subjective time. This is, however, a minor crit-
icism: if Prosser’s arguments are primarily a priori in character, he is sensitive
to empirical evidence at key points, and his a priori arguments are themselves
developed in a style that manages to achieve an admirable combination of
rigour and accessibility, making for a book that can be read with profit both
by specialists and by non-specialists.
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